ABSTRACT
differences in assumptions made about the nature of reality and how we come to know phenomena.
"Old hat" methods are more wedded to the assumption that there is a real world which exists "out there," and that if we are rigorous enough in our observations, we will be able to obtain an increasingly accurate and objective view of that world. "New wave" theorists, on the other hand, insist that, even if there is an ontologically real world, we can never have objective access to that world. Rather, all descriptions will be shaped by the perspective of the observer. While proponents of the later perspective have become increasingly active in critiquing the traditional family therapy research paradigm, little discussion has taken place regarding alternative directions for family therapy research. It is the purpose of this paper to promote such discussion,
The Construed vist View
To date, most family therapy research has been rooted to the traditional scientific notion that "objectivity" is possible (Torrun, 1983) . In this view of science, a researcher's primary task is to attempt to keep his or her own biases or opinions from entering into observations of the world. Kerlinger (1973) explains:
if the scientist believes something is so, he must somehow or other put his belief to a test outside himself. Subjective belief, in other words, must be checked against objective -8
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reality. (Kerlinger, 1973, p.11) While researchers who use this scientific method vary in the degree of confidence they place in the feasibility of gaining an objective view of their subject matter, the premise which unites them all is the belief that there is an objective reality out there," and that scientific progress can best be achieved by attempting to obtain more unbiased maps of reality.
In contrast to this position is one which insists that it is simply not possible to achieve an "objective" view of the world, because observations will always be influenced by the perspective of the observer. In the field of family therapy, the notion of the inseparability of the observer from the observed has been promoted by the constructivist implications of contemporary cybernetics. Keeney (1983) explains that contemporary cybernetics, sometimes called "cybernetics of cybernetics," emphasizes that observers are always part of the system they observe. The implication is that all observations involve self-reference, and any description says as much or more about the observer as it says about the subject of description.
Historically, a strong emphasis on the role of the observer in constructing "reality" can be traced to the philosophical position of radical constructivism (see note 1). Von Glasersfeld (1984) , one of the more articulate proponents of radical constructivism, holds that in constructivism, "there is the realization that knowledge, that is, what is 'known', cannot be the result of a passive receiving, but originates as the product of an active subject's activity" (p. 31). Rather than seeing social phenomena such as communication or marital satisfaction as existing "out there", available for the researcher to discover and measure, the constructivist holds 'that "all communication and all understanding are a matter of interpretive construction on the paxt of the experiencing subject... " (Von Glasersfeld, 1984, p.19 ). This view is evidenced in Watzlawick's (1984a) statement, "Relationships are not aspects of first-order reality, whose true nature can be determined scientifically; instead, they are pure constructs of the partners in the relationship, and as such they resist all objective verification" (p.238).
The shift to a constructivist epistemology is no small one. Von Glasersfeld (1974) asserts:
It is not a question of merely adjusting a definition here and there, or of rearranging familiar concepts in a somewhat novel fashion.
The change that is required is of a far more drastic nature. It involves the demolition of our everyday conception of reality... it shakes the very foundations on which 19th century science and most of 20th century psychology, has been built, and it is therefore not at all unlike the change that was wrought in physics by the joint impact of relativity and quantum.
mechanics. (p.2)
It is important to note the distinction between the constructivist position and the position which has been called solipsism. The solipsist view is that the world is made up entirely of our constructions, with no reference to an external world. Constnictivism holds that the world of experience is neither entirely made up, nor entirely independent of an observer's activity. Keeney (1983) Schwartz & Breunlin, 1983, p.27) . Donald Campbell (1975) ,
himself an author of a widely used experimental design book based upon the traditional research epistemology, has strongly criticized such rigidity, asserting that "The epistemic arrogance of behavior and social scientists is perhaps as much an obstacle, . as is the epistemic arrogance which traditional religionists exhibit in their claims of revelation and absolute certainty" (p.1120).
Family-therapy theorists who are in the new wave tradition maintain that the picture is changing, albeit slowly. Tornrn (1983) writes: ". . . it has become increasingly obvious that we tend to create and see that which we are looking for ... There is now clear acknowledgement of the role of the scientist in constructing his or her own theoretical models" (pp. 39-40) . Similarly, Keeney and Morris (1985b) assert that social science is experiencing a shift "from a monological paradigm where the observer is not allowed to enter his/her descriptions, to a dialogical paradigm where descriptions reveal the nature of the observer" (p.549). Their conclusion, which seems to represent the general position of "new wave" researchers, is that if we are to continue on the cutting edge of science, we must recognize alternative strategies of research -each with its own rules and ideas about discovery and verification. "Psychotherapists will, then not speak of Ibt scientific method, but will speak of scientific methods or even more generally of a wide variety of formal methods of inquiry" (Keeney & Morris, 1985b, p.550) . Speaking specifically of the human and social sciences, Bernstein states that philosophers are now arguing that there are no hard facts of the matter and that "it is an illusion and a deep self-deception to think that there is some overarching framework, some neutral descriptive language, some permanent standards of rationality to which we can appeal in order to understand and critically evaluate the competing claims that are made" (p.3).
It is often assumed that the alternative to objectivism is relativism, the position that any view is as good as another. However, relativism has been soundly rejected by recent philosophers of science. Richard Rorty, himself considered by many to be a In sum, the view of science emerging from the work of many recent philosophers of science is one that moves beyond both objectivism and relativism. The notion of objectivity is rejected, but so is the idea that there can be no rational means by which the relative legitimacy of competing views can be determined. We return to the central question; How then, can relative legitimacy be determined?
We think that the strongest answer to this question is implicit in the writings of Thomas Kuhn (1962 Kuhn ( , 1970 Kuhn ( , 1977 . Kuhn argues that the legitimacy of any view should be determined by applying the same criteria we always have used in making such decisions. There are a number of criteria for evaluating theories that have been quite universally accepted throughout the history of science. Among these are the criteria of accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. The problem is not so much one of which criteria are to be applied, but one regarding the procedure by which they are applied in making decisions about the legitimacy of theories. Unfortunately, there is no universal procedure for uniformly applying these criteria. Scientists who share the same criteria continuously make different choices in the same concrete situation. Kuhn writes, "there is no neutral algorithm for theory choice, no fauna! of Strategic and Systemic Therapies systematic decision procedure which, properly applied must lead each individual in the group to the same decision" (1962, p. 200) . In other words, the accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness of a theory cannot be determined through objective data gathering. Kuhn maintains that the criteria for theory choice serve as values that influence choice rather than rules which assure that all scientists will make the same choice. Theory choice is an open process in which general criteria are applied uniquely by individual scientists in diverse situations. The way each individual scientist applies the general criteria will depend upon the individual's specific history, values, and life situation. However, this is not to say that theory choice is an arbitrary or irrational process. Kuhn insists that any individual who 'wishes to be taken seriously must defend his choice by citing reasons and arguments that are sensible to the scientific community at large.
In sum, "Theory choice is a judgmental activity requiring imagination, interpretation, the weighing of alternatives, and application of criteria that are essentially open. But such judgments also need to be supported by reasons (reasons which themselves change and vary in the course of scientific development). This is not a deficiency but an intrinsic characteristic of this judgemental process that rational individuals can and do disagree without either of them being guilty of making a mistake.
While the 'balance of argument and counterargument in support of conflicting judgements can sometimes be very close indeed' (Kuhn, 1962, p. 157) , in the course of further scientific development, the force of the arguments in support of one of these conflicting judgements does become decisive for the community of The most basic point in the preceeding argument is that, since individuals often legitimately differ on how to apply general criteria in evaluating theories in specific situations, theory choice is always an individual matter. An individual cannot "take someone else's word for it". Rather, each scientist must individually weigh the evidence, making the decision that makes most sense to him or her. Scientists can profitably attempt to obtain some degree of consensus, because there is general agreement as to the criteria to be used in evaluating theoretical constructions (See note 3).
Research is generally seen as one method used by scientists to persuade one another regarding the legitimacy of their theoretical constructions, We think that research can (and should) continue to fulfill this function. HoWever, sonic change -s-the 'Way that' research is conducted and reported may be warranted if one takes the constructivist theory of knowledge seriously.
In a typical research report in the social sciences, a researcher will argue that he or she has discovered some data that supported the legitimacy of a theory. A problem is that the reader does not get to see the data until after it has been been organized by the researcher. In fact, the term "data" is often meant to refer to the results of a statistical analysis, rather than the "raw" sensory data. As Gergen (1982) has noted, "Empirical research in the sociobehavioral sciences does not furnish observations. That is, the audience for research reports is never exposed to ongoing events; one never gains first-hand experience with the research process itself' (p. 103).
In order to organize the raw data into chunks which can be statistically analyzed, the researcher is generally required to draw a host of distinctions, organizing the data to fit into his or her conceptual categories. We are not saying that this is bad. We think it is inevitable. One must organize the world in specific ways in order to make sense of it. Our point is that, as researchers, In sum, the process we are suggesting is one in which researchers retrace the distinctions they have drawn in constructing any view of the data, so that the reader may do likewise. In a sense, the reader is taught the process, of constructing a view. Once readers learn the particular way of drawing distinctions proposed and illustrated by a researcher, they can begin applying the set of distinctions in their own daily experiences.
Readers will decide the legitimacy of the set of distinctions as they try it out for themselves. Although most readers will apply the same general criteria in deciding the legitimacy of any particular way of constructing experience, each will apply the criteria uniquely. Criteria of choice influence the decision of readers rather than dictate the choice to be made.
While any research report could be improved by more clearly exposing the reader to the data being studied, it may be that some kinds of data will be more useful than other kinds. For example, a reader may benefit more from having access to ongoing sequences of interaction rather than decontextualized pieces of data that have been selectively elicited by the researcher.
Ideally, the reader would witness the same events as the researcher. Having studied the data carefully, the researcher would propose to the reader a particular method of drawing distinctions upon the data. The intent of the researcher would be to develop and present a theory concerning a pattern or structure that may meaningfully organize the observable data. In general, the quality of a research report might be determined by how fully the researcher allows the reader access to the research process.
To a certain extent, this method has been used by teachers of therapy for decades. Readers are presented with a transcript of interaction and simultaneously offered a commentary indicating how the teacher/researcher draws distinctions or organizes the data to make sense of it. Readers are left to determine the legitimacy of the specific way of sense-making.
And they are in a good position to do so, because they have been presented with the actual ongoing interaction as well as a prescription for drawing distinctions.
One of the more recent research endeavors of this type within the field of family therapy has been knernal of Strategic and Systemic Therapies conducted by Bradford Keeney and Jeff Ross (1985) . Keeney and Ross describe research their report as "an invitation to try on a pair of constructivist lenses a request to construct a particular way of knowing systemic family therapies" (personal communication, 1984) . They give careful attention to describing how they as researchers enter into their descriptions of what transpires in therapy. Specifically, they illustrate how their theoretical maps, which they call "laws of therapeutic form," and "cybernetics of multiple we might consider "video journals" where the reader is actually exposed to the process being examined, along with the researcher's prescriptions for organizing or making sense of the process. Again, this has been effectively done in the clinical world, but has rarely been called research.
conclusion An important shift occurs in the sort of research being suggested in this paper. The burden of responsibility for determining the legitimacy of any particular way of constructing reality is moved from the researcher to the reader. Traditionally, the researcher is expected to proceed in an unbiased manner to determine whether a theory holds up to rigorous investigation or not. In a research report, the researcher gives a ° summary statement about the process and end results of the research, and then asks the reader to believe that a particular hypothesis is supported by a research process that the reader has not seen.
Ironically, however, it seems that the reader, if he or she happens to be a clinician, tends not to listen to the researcher. In 1983, Schwartz and Breunlin conducted a series of interviews, asking prominent family therapy researchers and clinicians their views regarding the relevance of research for clinical practice.
They summarize:
Most of the practitioners we spoke with reported that they rarely read research papers will start doing A. That assumption is preposterously naive, (quoted in Schwartz and Breunlin, 1983, pp. 24-25) .
In sum, it seems that clinicians are not willing to take the pronouncements of researchers seriously. We think this is appropriate. Perhaps intuitively, each of us suspects that we cannot really "take someone else's word for it," We all want to trust our own judgements.
We think its time to move research in a direction that more fully encourages readers as well as researchers to experience the research proces. The result is likely to be a renewed sense of community, where everyone realizes that no one individual , is in a better position to pronounce legitimacy than another. Francisco Varela has envisioned the potential of such a community:
If everybody would agree that their current reality is reality, and that what we essentially share is our capacity for constructing a reality, then perhaps we could agree on a metaagreement for computing a reality that would view. This has been Zone elsewhere in detail (Keeney, 1983; Maturana, 1976 Maturana, , 1978 Maturana & Varela, 1980; Powers, 1973; Richards & von Glasersfeld, 1979; Smock & von Glasersfeld, 1974; Varela, 1979; von Foerster, 1981; Watzlawick, 1984c) .
(3) In the view being proposed here, there is nothing intrinsically "foundational" or necessary about these criteria. Kuhn arrives at these criteria simply by observing that: (1) We all hold certain views of the world as being more legitimate than others, although we may vary on the degree to which we are convinced of relative legitimacy of the views, and the degree to which we are open to be persuaded otherwise; (2) Individuals use specific criteria in theory choice (One cannot not use criteria in choosing to assert one theory as more legitimate .than another); and (3) Certain criteria can be identified that are nearly universally accepted, That these criteria are generally accepted does not mean that they are necessarily "true" or "correct." It does, however, give us a common reference point that can be used in carrying on science.
